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One case conducted and won by attorneys Wiesław Szczepiński, Jan Ciećwierz and Janusz Tomczak concerned protection of our client, who acquired a share in real estate ownership, against acquisitive prescription. A second instance court, in contrast to a District Court, found that statute of limitations for acquisitive prescription was interrupted and that no acquisitive prescription by a co-owner of the entire real estate took place.

Two procedural aspects proved worthy of particular attention in this case. First, the Regional Court essentially altered the first instance judgment by not reviewing additional evidence. Secondly, the Supreme Court did not find any factors justifying acceptance of this appeal for review.

The complex factual status of the case required an assessment of certain facts from 1944 when A. K., the owner of a several hectare farm near Warsaw, died. Presently, this land lies within city limits near a major road, which undeniably affects its value. This inheritance went to six children of A.K., each receiving a 1/6 share of the property. In subsequent years, they informally agreed with each other on the use of this land.

When the heirs of A.K. died, their children took their place. This process continued for generations with each receiving an increasingly smaller fraction, whereby some of them sold their shares to relatives. Most recently the real estate was co-owned by nearly 30 persons. Already in 1996-1997, five descendents of A.K. sold their shares to the Company that became party to proceedings. In turn, those heirs administering this land sought to gain its full ownership prior to acquisition of prescription. In order to do so, they had to prove the fact of their usufruct of this land. M.K. represented them.

The effort only proved to be partially successful before a District Court, which determined that ownership had a dependence nature in relation to the shares of two out of six brothers. This arose from an agreement on the basis of which, in exchange for usufruct, they were accorded in-kind benefits and financial assistance. In the view of the court, this situation did not occur in the case of remaining siblings. This possession was autonomous. The court therefore ruled that acquisitive prescription of these shares took place in 1964.

A Regional Court did not concur with this resolution. In its assessment, the District Court erroneously evaluated the nature of possession by M.K. of the other heirs’ shares. This is countered by documents collected in case files, which refer, among others, to actions undertaken after 1944. They indicate the exercise of ownership rights on the part of all heirs. At that time, in 1953 and 1954, all participated in expropriation proceedings. In the view of the Regional Court, joint exercise of these rights lasted at least until 1962 when all of them collectively sold a part of their ownership to a gardening cooperative.

The fact is that a change in the nature of possession may take place on the part of a holder during a period of possession: from non-autonomous to autonomous. This indeed was the case here, but only in 1975. M.K. manifested this by initiating administrative proceedings aimed at acquiring ownership of the subject real estate on the basis of the Agricultural Property Ownership Regulation Act of 26 November 1971 (three land ownership deeds were issued in these proceedings, but were subsequently repealed).

The altered nature of possession could lead to acquisitive prescription within 20 years starting from this date. M.K. was a holder acting in bad faith, since he knew about the existence of other property co-owners. The acquisitive prescription deadline would have expired in November 1995. However, the Civil Code Amendment Act of 28 July 1990 (Journal of Laws, no. 55, pos. 321) extended the period for acquisitive prescription in good faith to 20 years and in bad faith to 30 years. M.K. could therefore acquire the real estate through acquisitive prescription at the earliest in November 2005. However, the deadline was interrupted already in October 1983 when M.K. acted to divide the A.K. inheritance. Other co-owners undertook action during the course of these proceedings, which aimed to protect their ownership rights. For this reason the Regional Court determined that acquisitive prescription did not occur at the moment of adjudication by courts in both instances.

In this situation, M.K. filed a final appeal with the Supreme Court. The basis for its acceptance was the alleged discrepancy of the justification with adjudication, which pointed to the existence of vital legal issues that the Supreme Court had to resolve.

In reply, our client indicated the lack of grounds justifying acceptance of a final appeal. A party can only base such an appeal on two factors. The first is violation of substantive law through its erroneous interpretation or improper application, and the second is violation of procedural regulations if this could have significantly influenced the case outcome.

The basis of a final appeal cannot be charges concerning determination of facts or evaluation of evidence.

The Supreme Court did not review the appeal for this reason.